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Abstract
Municipal councils in Ontario are charged with the administration and control of organizations
through the Municipal Act, 2001. Councils are responsible for the financial and service
performance of a wide variety of activities. Should the activities and finances be poorly linked,
this could lead to an accountability disconnect. This research explores how well municipalities
in Ontario link strategic planning to financial planning, and how they communicate this to the
public. Nine municipalities were randomly selected representing small, medium, and large
municipalities in the south, central, and northern regions of the province. Municipalities
primarily rely on their corporate strategic plans and asset management plans to manage their
initiatives and assets; these publicly available documents were used to evaluate connections
between financial planning, strategic planning, and public communication. Results indicate
some level of maturation with strategic planning and financial planning, and clear public
communication. Only 56% of municipalities connected their budget to a strategic plan. Loss
aversion information was more frequently published (89%), explaining the individual financial
impacts to stakeholders. Regarding loss aversion, municipalities rarely published individualized
gains to contextualize individualized losses or costs (33%). In regards to this framing, a
municipality’s ability to influence public opinion by publishing its performance is largely in its
own hands. Pressure to satisfy the public may incentivize politicians to highlight ‘easy wins’ to
sway overall public opinion. Effective strategic planning linked to financial planning undermines
these incentives by contextualizing strategic priorities using published goals and measuring
progress.
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Introduction
Municipal councils in Ontario are charged with the administration and control of municipal
organizations through the Municipal Act, 2001 (Ontario Municipal Act, 2001). Management
and control of organizations is about “steering organizations through the environments through
which they operate, to achieve both short-term and longer-term goals” (Otley et al., 2014).
Municipalities are created as “creatures of the province” to administer government services at
a local level (Magnusson, 2005). Across government and the private sector, financial
performance of corporations is a common indicator of results (Stout, 2012). If financial
performance is not clearly linked to service delivery, how does that affect political and
organizational effectiveness? As per the Municipal Act (2001), the primary financial planning
tool for local government is the budget, however many other acts have their own performance
and reporting requirements. This requires municipalities to submit over 225 separate reports
annually to the province and regulatory bodies (AMCTO, 2017).
As to municipal strategic planning, official plans are required to be maintained by every
municipality to govern planning and development. In comparison, budgets were designed for
the management of public services, although influence from private business is common
through the historical record (Rubin, 1993). Budgets form the basis for allocating resources to
deliver public services. Therefore, through that allocation, budgets determine strategic
decisions, but do they supply enough information that can be used to hold leaders accountable
for public services as well as public spending? Since municipal councils’ responsibility is for
service delivery while using finance as a tool to meet service delivery ends, financial resource
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allocation decisions by municipal councils should be dependent on clear contextual information
supplied alongside financial information. This information is not required or is not required to
be presented alongside budgetary information (Ontario Municipal Act, 2001). While some basic
contextual information is required after-the-fact through Financial Information Returns (FIR),
the systematic disconnect between the plan (budget) and the actuals (FIR) lead to an
accountability disconnect. Without clear connections between strategic planning and financial
allocations, budgets may act as a substitute for strategic planning with insufficient public
transparency. When financial information alone is provided with little context during public
debates or discussion, municipal councils’ performance management of their organization via
the budget process may have unintended consequences. Gabris (1992) posited that
“rationalistic” strategic plans don’t necessarily mesh with “incremental” characteristics of
municipal budget systems, but the reality may not be that black and white. Effective strategic
planning should link plans to resources. This research will explore the following research
question:

How well do municipalities in Ontario link strategic planning to financial planning, and how
do they communicate this to the public?

This question has great significance to the over-all intention of budget as a performance
management tool for Ontario municipalities. While municipalities may have performance
measurement and management systems for few or many of their public programs, if they are
not closely tied to performance indicators in the budget process, councils will not have the
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appropriate frame of reference to allocate resources and manage outputs or outcomes of
public programs. If there are complaints that the municipality is not meeting the goals of its
strategic plan, does that mean that the budget is not being spent? If this strategic and financial
information is presented to council but is not laid out clearly for the public, then the public will
be unable to ascertain if the financial allocations meet their needs and desires. This potential
disconnect between financial and service performance also clouds political accountabilities as
the connection between financial performance, service performance, and political will or vision
is weak. In the broader business sense, this disconnect has been identified repeatedly by
others (Drucker, 1954; Ghalayini and Noble, 1996; Goold and Quinn, 1990; Fitzgerald, 1988;
Johnson and Kaplan, 1987), and would provide greater accountability when applied to
municipal politics.

As we explore the topic further, it is important to have a common understanding of terms.
Performance Measurement Systems (PMeS) and Performance Management systems (PMaS)
will be frequently referenced in this research, and can have significant differences in meaning.
Performance Measurement Systems are typically used to develop comparability within and
between businesses and time periods. The term can be quite broadly applied, leading to
uncertainty of the meaning in each specific context (Franco-Santos et al, 2007). Based on
Franco-Santos et al.’s systematic literature review in 2007, they developed a set of key
categories to define performance measurement systems’ role, including specific conditions
within which they operate:
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(1) “measure performance” - This category encompasses the role of monitoring progress
and measuring/evaluating performance;
(2) “strategy management” - This category comprises the roles of planning, strategy
formulation, implementation/execution, and organizational alignment;
(3) “communication” - This comprises the roles of internal and external communication,
benchmarking and compliance with regulations;
(4) “influence behaviour” - This category encompasses the roles of rewarding or
compensating behaviour, managing relationships, and control; and
(5) “learning and improvement” - This comprises the roles of feedback, double-loop
learning, and performance improvement.

Broadbent and Laughlin (2009), as well as others (Ferreira and Otley, 2009; Malmi and Brown,
2008), define performance management systems as a broad set of management control
mechanisms used by leaders and employees with the overall purpose of facilitating the delivery
of organizational goals by influencing people’s behaviour and performance. For the purpose of
this study, any reference to Continuous Improvement and Continuous Quality Improvement
Programs are contained within the definition of PMaS. PMaS were previously known as
management control systems, which focused mostly on financial and budgetary controls
(Ferreira and Otley, 2009; Otley, 1999). Examples of a PMaS would include a work
measurement system, work priority management system, or worker reward system.
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In the municipal democratic context, the 5 key categories of “measure performance, strategy
management, communication, influence behaviour, and learning and improvement” all closely
relate to public perception of what a city delivers to its citizens. This brings us to the idea of
public value. Public value describes the value that an organization contributes to society, in a
broader sense than shareholder value alone which primarily focuses on financial returns
(Friedrich & Eerma, 2018; Moore, 1995). To contextualize the cost-benefit of taxation and fees
against municipal services, it is in a municipality’s best interest to demonstrate the value that
citizens and others receive in exchange for their financial contributions. While it is simple to
compare tax burdens, fee structures, and other financial tools over time and across
jurisdictions, public value lies in the eyes and mind of the citizen. Values are highly variable
between individuals, cultures, and communities, demonstrating the need to develop a public
value proposition with broad public appeal and common understanding.

When considering municipal resource allocation and the determination of public value, there
may be side effects or unintended consequences of any particular set of decisions or actions.
Baert (1991, p.201) defines unintended consequences as “a particular effect of purposive action
which is different from what was wanted the moment of carrying out the act, and the want of
which was a reason for carrying it out.” It is not clear in the original definition that a purposive
action may have more than one effect, but it is assumed for the purpose of this research that
an action may produce more than one effect. For example, a particular action measured and
managed in a PMaS may produce the intended outcome as well as an unintended outcome.
Baert (1991) explains that most research equates unintended consequences with
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unanticipated, unforeseen, or unexpected effects. It is important to note that unintended
consequences can be positive, negative, or neutral in comparison to the intended
consequences.

Municipal Performance Management: Contextual Analysis
Municipalities in Ontario are legally created by the province and enabled through the Municipal
Act, 2001. As ‘creatures of the province’ (Magnusson, 2005), these municipal corporations are
accountable to the province for their performance in a hierarchical sense. However, since
municipalities have their own elected officials and their own legal identity as a corporation, that
accountability link is primarily at the local level. The Municipal Act (2001) is designed as
enabling legislation, empowering municipalities to the activities as outlined in the act. In
section 23.3, the act outlines powers that cannot be delegated, which includes the power to
adopt and amend the budget of the municipality, while subsection 2 clarifies that nothing in
23.3(1) prevents a municipality from delegating its administrative powers. This fundamentally
separates a municipal council’s financial accountability from service delivery. As an example of
provincial oversight, the province of Ontario operated the Municipal Performance
Measurement Program, starting in the early 2000s and ending in 2014, during a time where
performance management in municipalities was growing (Melkers & Willoughby, 2005). This
mandatory program provided base level data for the public and the province to compare costs
for service. Even with this pan-municipal performance measurement system, the
measurements were heavily weighted in financial terms:
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Table 1: Relative Types of Ontario MPMP Indicators

MPMP Numerical or unit

Count of Standard Indicators

% of total

57

37.5

83

54.6

Measures
MPMP Financial Measures

MPMP Relative (%) Measures 12

8

In the international context, a growing number of cities are subscribing to the ISO 37120: 2018 Sustainable Cities and Community standard. This international standard allows the systematic
comparison of performance metrics for municipalities and communities world-wide, with the
majority of indicators being non-financial, focusing instead on service delivery and quality of life
(ISO, 2020).

Considering the shift to a broader scheme of performance standardization introduced by the
ISO 37120 standard and the individual’s right to choose their leadership as espoused through
the Charter of Rights & Freedoms, let us discuss the forces at work in personal choice and
behavioural economics.

Behavioural Economics
Beyond systemic variances innate to PMaS theoretical foundations, municipal decisions made
by council are subject to the individual human strengths and frailties of each individual
municipal councillor and administrator. Aside from political pressures that may compete with
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rational decision making, decisions are also subject to human biases that decision makers may
or may not be aware of as an individual or group. Consideration must be given to behavioural
economics in the municipal context.

In any institution, behavioural economics will be influenced by habits, routines, and customs of
actors, with their decisions being framed within their abilities and environment (Kahneman &
Tversky, 1996). Social rewards for following institutional patterns of decision making may beget
similar decisions as those made in the past. In contrast to the simplicity and scientific rigour of
managing through detailed performance metrics, decision makers in municipalities may benefit
from being aware of the work of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky. According to their work,
actors may not behave as neoclassical economists may predict; individuals are not necessarily
rational and self-interested. Assumptions made about the rationality of actors framed by utility
theory does not fit well for all decision-making processes. There are additional factors to
consider other than maximization of utility, such as benefits gained through cooperation – a
critical consideration in the democratic context. In addition, errors in perception or recollection
of events may induce errors in decision making (Kahneman & Tversky, 1996). As municipal
politicians consider a multitude of factors during budget deliberations and/or strategic
planning, these effects, social rewards, and errors may influence choices or allocations.

For example, Rick (2011) explores the phenomena of loss aversion. Humans commonly
evaluate losses and gains asymmetrically, leading to reduced rationality when decision making.
The gain or loss scenario, the order in which the pros and cons are considered, and the feeling
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that losses are felt more than comparable gains, all factor in when an individual is considering
gaining or losing an item or service. He observes that ownership itself has inducement towards
liking, and losses may be experienced more acutely than gains (Rick, 2011).

These irrational behaviours were further explored by Kahneman & Tversky (1996) considering
actors’ heuristics and biases. The heuristics and biases approach they developed suggests that
human judgements are often affected by ‘judgemental heuristics’ such as the availability
heuristic (how easily an event comes to mind represents the frequency that this event
happens), the representativeness heuristic (“the degree to which [an event] 1- is similar in
essential characteristics to its parent population, and 2- reflects the salient features of the
process by which it is generated” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972)). Beyond individual heuristics,
societal norms also provide a framing and relatively common set of values or judgements
affecting gains and losses or other norms. These norms affect naturally intuitive predictions of
event probability, leading to significantly under-rated or neglected risks by actors and decision
makers, whether they are leaders or voters.

When we consider these mental short-cuts combined with the relatively short event horizon
that the fixed 4-year election cycle creates, how do municipalities assess their environment and
take calculated risks of benefit to the community? Thaler et al. (1997) explored “myopic loss
aversion,” that is an observed tendency for actors to be more sensitive to losses than to gains,
as well as a tendency to evaluate outcomes frequently using mental accounting. Mental
accounting is a cognitive activity that people use to aggregate how transactions are grouped
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temporarily and cross-sectionally; this mental accounting frames decision making. Loss
aversion explains the phenomena that people tend to be more sensitive to decreases in their
wealth than to increases, with losses weighted about twice as strongly as gains. In order to offset these perceived losses to tax payers, must municipalities be able to demonstrate their
services are twice as valuable as the tax dollars paid?

Exploring this temporal risk aversion heuristic further, Tversky & Kahneman (1991) identify that
choice depends on a status quo or reference level of actors. In scenarios where the reference
point is changed, preference order may be reversed. A central assumption of this theory is that
losses or disadvantages will have a greater influence than gains or advantages will. This
“reference dependence” means gains or losses are only calculated to a relative reference point.
“Loss aversion” was previously referenced, and “diminishing sensitivity” means that the value
of gains or losses decreases with size or impact. Note this has an asymmetric value/gain curve;
this observation begs the question: is loss aversion irrational? The value function of the
asymmetry between gains and losses points to three observations:
1) “organisms habituate to steady states”
2) “marginal response to change diminishes”
3) “pain is more urgent than pleasure” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991).

Knowing these evaluations of gains and losses are frequent during resource allocation
(budgeting) processes, how do decision makers maximize their decision outputs to generate
public value? Khalil (2013) reviews two types of maximization based on an individual’s beliefs.
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If the objective or intent is wellbeing, then beliefs are practical; if the objective is truth, then
beliefs are scientific. Khalil observes that rational choice theory has not addressed these
differing belief frameworks. If an agent makes an ‘error’ in a scientific belief framework, their
decision should not be considered irrational, as they are making a rational decision and
maximizing their practical wellbeing and not truth. Actors do not necessarily work only within
one framework; utility may not be the ultimate or only guiding influence. For example, would
the quest for truth be substituted for safety if the relative costs change? How do agents deal
with the relative cost of competing choices as they form their belief? Khalil (2013) reviews
three choices that actors must face:
1. Rational choice
2. Heuristics, and
3. Biases.
Considering Khalil’s analysis (2013), we must acknowledge that municipal decision makers have
limits to their rationality and computational power, leaving us with Herbert Simon’s notion of
‘bounded rationality’ (Simon, 1957; Heukelom, 2009). We can expect municipal decision
makers to behave in a rational manner within their specific context and within their abilities.
Some of the previous transactional examples on loss aversion may not translate well to nonpurchase type decisions; this is where Kahneman, Tversky, and Thaler’s further work on the
“endowment effect” fits well. In the context of the endowment effect, the carriers of utility
(municipal service delivery) are not ‘owning’ or ‘not owning’, but rather they monitor or
manage a change in state – interpreted as a loss or gain. As losses are typically weighted
heavier than gains, this therefore has an influence on ‘mental accounting’ balance. Errors or
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‘illogicities’ also creep into decision making when actors neglect to treat money as fungible
(Kahneman et al, 2004). Complicating things further, observers may use a different framework
of analysis from decision makers regarding objectives of truth and wellbeing.

Tversky and Kahneman (1992) highlight the challenges in evaluating decision alternatives in
uncertain environments in their development of prospect theory. They observe five
phenomena of choice that violate the traditional view of expected utility theory:
1. Framing effects: variations in framing affect preferences.
2. Non-linear preferences: utility of risky prospects is non-linear; perception of probability
affects observed preferences.
3. Source dependence: willingness to bet on uncertain events depends not only on degree
of uncertainty but on source.
4. Risk seeking: risk aversion is generally assumed except in the following observed
examples such as actors may prefer a small probability of winning a large prize over the
expected value of that prospect. Also, risk seeking is common when actors must choose
between a sure loss and a probability of a larger loss.
5. Loss aversion: losses loom larger than gains. Asymmetry between gains and losses is
too extreme to be explained by income effects or decreasing risk aversion.

Classical utility theory would posit that the utility of an uncertain prospect would be the sum of
the utility’s outcomes, weighted by each probability (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). However,
utility theory does not consider fully the environment within which the actor makes their
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decision. Tversky & Kahneman (1992) develop prospect theory to address this issue with two
phases:
1. Framing: the decision maker constructs a representation of the acts, outcomes, etc.
2. Valuation: the decision maker assigns value to each prospect and chooses accordingly.
They expand our understanding of value by using prospect theory to identify the following
characteristics of value:
1. Value is carried by gains and losses, not final assets.
2. Value of each outcome is modified by a weight, not an additive probability.
According the second characteristic above, actors have a mental weighting applied to their
value of each potential outcome; Tversky & Kahneman observe that the principle of diminishing
sensitivity applies to weighting of outcomes – the key reference point is the boundary
determining gains from losses. “Evidence indicates that human choices are orderly, although
not always rational in the traditional sense of the word” (Tverskey & Kahneman, 1992, p. 317).
So how does this understanding of prospect theory affect municipal resource allocation? First,
let us examine other potentially unintended consequences.

Unintended Consequences
While specific study of unintended consequences in performance management is limited, there
is a growing body of research on behavioural economics which sheds light on “goal-oriented
action” and “the science of the unexpected.” Consider the ratchet effects of performance
restriction as described by Charness et al. in 2011. In general, service providers may restrict
outputs if increased outputs will increase future output expectations. While municipalities may
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have internal performance systems to manage inputs, outputs, and outcomes, if there is public
transparency to the process, administrators may restrict outputs to manage future expectations
(Arce et al., 2017; Cardella & Depew, 2018). While there is evidence that the management
skills of top management teams have a strong influence on the performance of municipal
organizations (Carmeli, 2006), public transparency levels will influence performance ratchet
effects.
The positive impacts of performance measurement have been studied with a focus on strategic
alignment, communication, corporate control, or accounting performance. However, far fewer
studies have identified common negative impacts (Franco-Santos et al., 2018, p.696). A few
studies have identified common negative side effects, including measure fixation, myopia,
gaming, or manipulation of data (Bevan and Hood, 2006; Smith, 1995a). Should the
unintended negative consequences not be considered, systematic disadvantages may outweigh
the advantages or may introduce other undesirable outcomes. Let us consider theory
developed by Monica Franco-Santos and David Otley (2018) and others, and test these
assumptions against the realities of the Ontario municipal context. Based on the literature and
theoretical development performed by Franco-Santos et al (2018, p. 697), undesirable
unintended consequences are more likely to happen when systems are designed using false
assumptions about behaviour and the likelihood of uncertainties. Assumptions are not
necessarily conscious decisions, but may be due to ignorance, errors, self-fulfilling forecasts,
immediate short-term concerns, or variances in ideology. These assumptions become part of
the performance measurement and management tool and may change outcomes by altering
social relationships or modifying information that is used for decision making. These variations
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may cause unintended consequences whose costs are greater than the benefits. Franco-Santos
et al. (2018, p. 697) identify three impacts that their theoretical work has on existing research:
1. Provides words of caution regarding uncritical adoption of agency theory assumptions
when designing PMSs,
2. Contributes to previous performance management contingency research providing
additional evidence regarding the importance of ‘fit’ between control mechanisms and
their environment, and
3. Study enriched understanding of the effectiveness of PMaSs by illuminating the reasons
why unintended consequences may occur, so they can be minimized, although never
eliminated.

Based on the literature review, this study will focus on testing whether budget documents
provide contextual performance information so the most common unintended consequences
of performance management can be avoided in Ontario municipalities (Franco-Santos et al.,
2018).

Performance Management Systems

Common Assumptions
Franco-Santos et al. (2018, p. 700) identify several common assumptions in performance
management systems:
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•

Each control system or subsystem is considered a PMaS in its own right (Ferreira and Otley,
2009; Malmi and Brown, 2008; Otley, 1999).
o Subsystems are often designed by different people and at different points in
time.
o Subsystems often work differently within different organizational functions and
at different hierarchical levels.
o These separate or differing systems are assumed to act in a coordinated way to
help the organization attain its goals (although this is rarely achieved in practice
according to Otley (2016)).

•

Control mechanisms are understood to be connected to each other in different ways.
o According to Weick (1976), these systems could be considered to be ‘tightly’ or
‘loosely’ connected to each other.
o Some connections could have causal relationships.

•

PMSs are constantly evolving, including the evolution of control mechanisms and system
elements.

•

Control mechanisms for a PMS can be formal or informal.
o Formal control mechanisms include tangible objects that can be controlled and
changed.
o Informal controls include less tangible social factors that could include peer
pressure, social routines, or other phenomena that are more difficult to
investigate and change. Franco-Santos (2018, p.700) notes that there is a general
understanding in literature that the unintended dysfunctional effects of formal
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controls can be mitigated by the use of informal means, despite little explanation
of the observation.
•

PMSs are built on implicit or explicit mental models that predict likely outcomes (Otley and
Berry, 1980).
o Operational actors or managers may have important distinctions in their mental
models, and therefore could use control mechanisms differently.
o Designers’ models are often based on assumptions about people, systems, and
environmental conditions, as well as the control mechanisms that best suit the
organization’s drivers of success.

Franco-Santos et al. (2018, p. 701) identify three theories with a primary influence on PMaSs.
These three theories provide a foundation for the creation and management of PMaSs, and
testing the prevalence of these theories will provide a context for analysis. The three
foundational theories are as follows:
•

Contingency theory of accounting (Shepherd and Suddaby, 2017; Weick, 1989)
o This theory posits that control mechanisms are most effective when tailored to
fit specific circumstances, not universally applied.

•

Agency theory (Eisenhard, 1989; Jensen and Meckling, 1976)
o This theory posits that organizations seek to meet the expectations of their
owners, and that employees are self-serving, opportunistic, effort-averse, and
risk-averse. To mitigate these self-interests, agency theory applies monitoring
systems with explicit goals and performance measures that provide information

22
used to assess employee behaviour and the results of their actions; incentive
systems can be used to leverage self-interest and encourage employees to focus
on the organization’s goals.
•

Stewardship theory (Davis et al., 1997; Hernandez, 2012)
o This theory is also used to explain the same choice, use, and consequences of
control mechanisms but suggests that the assumptions of agency theory are too
restrictive and reliance on the restrictive assumptions causes could lead to
undesirable consequences. This theory’s main assumption is that organizations
often have multiple and complex goals, employees can act as stewards, and can
have a shared sense of responsibility with multiple stakeholders. This theory
relies on the assumption that uncertainty is the natural state, and monitoring or
incentive controls may undermine the stewardship of the employees. This
theory is viewed as being ‘enabling’ rather than Agency theory’s ‘directive’
approach (Franco-Santos and Doherty, 2017)

Waddington (2016) identifies research coming from sociology with a focus on ‘unrecognized,
unintended, and emergent consequences of goal-oriented action” while Portes (2000) reviews
the ‘science of the unexpected’. Fundamental to this discussion the definition of unintended
consequences. Baert (1991, p. 201) defines them as “a particular effect of purposive action
which is different from what was wanted the moment of carrying out the act, and the want of
which was a reason for carrying it out”. The term ‘purposive action’ was originally used by
economists and politicians (Smith, 1759) but was popularized by Merton (1936). It is not clear
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in the definition that a purposive action may have more than one effect, but it is assumed for
the purpose of this research that an action may produce more than one effect.

Systematic Assumptions
Baert (1991), Mica et al (2011), Merton (1936) and Franco-Santos et al. (2018 p.702) identify
the following shared assumptions in research and theorization in regard to unintended
consequences:
•

There is a ‘recognized intention’ by the primary actor.

•

Any ‘purposive social action’ will unavoidably have unintended consequences, irrespective
of whether they are beneficial or detrimental.

•

There is an assumed spectrum from unintended-functional to unintended-dysfunctional for
all possible unintended consequences.

•

Unintended consequences may be minimized but never completely eliminated.

•

Some unintended consequences may be expected by actors, other consequences not.

•

Minimization of the undesirable consequences must be theorized and managed to prevent
a PMaS backfire.

Merton (1936) identified five factors that could limit the actors’ ability to anticipate
consequences of their actions:
•

Lacking knowledge or ignorance of knowledge they possess,

•

Appraising current and future situations incorrectly, and therefore affect action choice,

•

Weighting short-term consequences heavily, over long-term consequences,
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•

Fundamental values may justify necessity of actions, and

•

Preconceived ideas concerning possible outcomes affect judgement (or self-fulfilling
prophecy).

Elias (1997; 1998) tied these limiting factors together under an umbrella argument, explaining
that unintended consequences are the result of existing social relationships. When social
relationships are complex, each actor would have a limited understanding of the whole
environment and therefore actions based on this incomplete knowledge could have unintended
consequences (Mennell, 1977). This study will gain insight into these effects by examining
specific examples of unintended consequences through systematic review.

Common Unintended Consequences
This study will work within Franco-Santos et al.’s (2018) framework of the most commonly
experienced unintended consequences of PMaSs and their causes, as described in their
literature review. The authors note that the framework primarily identifies unintended
consequences of a negative or dysfunctional nature, and that any positive or functional effects
have been largely overlooked in existing research. In addition, most research focuses on the
review of directive control measures endorsed by agency theorists such as Eisenhard (1989)
and Jensen and Meckling (1976). Little study has been done on stewardship-based PMaSs
where the enablement of actors is the focus. Franco-Santos et al. (2018) distills five categories
of unintended consequences in PMaS systems:
•

Directive PMaSs encourage strategic behaviour or gaming in individuals, potentially
breaching ethical norms.
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•

Directive PMaSs are associated with information manipulation used to meet performance
targets.

•

PMaSs can generate ‘selective attention’ both in what is measured and the timing of
measurement. PMaS changes managers’ focus to short-term objectives (myopia) rather
than actions that may have greater long-term benefits.

•

Directive PMaSs can create an illusion of control, increasing belief in assumptions of
performance rather than actual performance.

•

Directive and enabling PMaSs commonly alter social relationships within organizations.
Directive systems can promote transactional relationships and erode trust. Enabling
systems can reduce mistrust and corruption.

Other unintended consequences can include: increased managerial time cost for PMS (Cox,
2005), movement away from professional values or standards (Tan and Rae, 2009), decreased
well-being or morale (Bonner and Sprinkle, 2002), stifling of innovation (Lindsay et al., 2014),
and inequalities (Cuguero-Escofet and Rosanas, 2016). Franco-Santos (2018) notes that a
significant amount of research into dysfunctional effects in PMS has been done in public sector
organizations and the majority of consequences were deemed to be perverse. In the for-profit
sector, the studied unintended consequences seem to be more aligned with strategic behaviour
including information manipulation and short-termism or myopia (Healy, 1985).
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Cause and Effect: Outcomes of Performance Management Systems

Unintended Consequences in Performance Management Systems
Franco-Santos (2018) identified three most common causes of unintended consequences in
PMaSs:
•

Managers perceive increased performance pressure (Li, 2015; Merchant, 1990). Increased
performance pressure increases potential for negative behaviours, which may be
internalized or rationalized and lead to decreased trust in social interactions. Based on
agency theory, directive PMaS controls send a message to employees that they cannot be
trusted. Based on this influence, employees trend towards opportunistic behaviour
(Cardinaels and Yin, 2015) and therefore influence social norms in the same direction. In
mission-focused entities, professional values dominate (steward rather than self-interest)
while theories of behaviour, relationships, and complex contextual factors can cause direct
controls to tend towards negative outcomes (Chwastiak, 2006; Kerpershoek et al., 2016;
McCann et al., 2015).

•

The specific design or use of PMaS (Hopwood, 1972; Mannion and Braithwaite, 2012) can
lead to unintended consequences. For example, the link between performance
measurement and rewards is a critical choice, as actors’ sense of gain or loss can lead to
strategic behaviour, coordination effects, collaboration issues, and negative social dynamics
(Lowe and Shaw, 1968).
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•

Environmental complexity (Conrad and Guven Uslu, 2012; Cox, 2005) can also lead to
unintended consequences. Managers’ uncertainty in complex systems may lead them to
react to financial pressures by gaming the system (Merchant, 1990). Continuous change in
leadership can create increased uncertainty and increased opportunities for gaming
(Berliner, 1956). Highly regulated and complex environments such as hospitals or airports
provide more opportunities for side effects in directive PMaS environments. Finally, some
researchers found that underlying assumptions about human behaviour cause unintended
consequences (Cardinaels and Yin, 2015; Franco-Santos et al., 2017).

Testing A New Theory of Unintended Consequences in Performance
Management Systems
Franco-Santos et al (2018) proposed new theories that could govern management of
unintended consequences in PMaSs:
•

“An identified set of ideal PMaS types will maximize the fit between the chosen control
mechanisms and the existing organizational conditions:”
o Fit is best determined by careful design of ‘purposeful actions’ (Merton 1936) in
the PMaS.
o Organizations have a variety of control mechanisms available to them (Bedford
et al 2016) with a directive or enabling focus.

•

Goal alignment and goal uncertainty
o Managers choose controls using two factors: they make assumptions about the
level of goal alignment, and also about goal uncertainty (Broadbent and Laughlin
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2009). Franco-Santos et al. (2018) proposed a framework for the management of
unintended consequences based on the understanding of goal-alignment and
the environmental characteristics affecting goal uncertainty (see proposed
framework in Figure 1). In this model, when managers assume that workers act
opportunistically (goal alignment) and when they are less certain about
outcomes (goal certainty), PMaS actions aligned with agency theory (directive)
will prevail. In situations where there is high goal certainty and high goal
alignment, enabling PMaS systems will emerge aligned with stewardship theory.
Although agency and stewardship approaches are not mutually exclusive
(Franco-Santos et al. 2014), exploring how municipalities use these systems is
related to this research. Much of the existing research on PMaSs focuses on
agency-based systems, but organizations with complex goals, such as
municipalities, will endure problems under agency-focused PMaS (Franco-Santos
et al. 2018). This research is aligned with contingency research (Chenhall 2003;
Otley 2016) which explains how appropriate controls are unlikely to be universal;
different circumstances may require different controls.
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Figure 1: Franco-Santos et al.'s (2018) proposed framework for managing the unintended
consequences of PMSs

Performance Budgeting
Rivenbark and Kelly reviewed municipal performance measures in the context of multiple
accountabilities and process management in their 2006 article “Performance Budgeting in
Municipal Government.” They surveyed municipalities to determine their capacity to build
performance measurement capabilities into the municipal budgeting process and evaluated
their use during budget development. The authors used financial, political, and performance
accountabilities to frame the performance measures discussion and analysis in an interpretivist
approach. They defined performance budgeting as the act of using performance results to
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inform allocation decisions during budget preparation and adoption. Rivenbark and Kelly
(2006) defined their methodology to evaluate the level of performance budgeting adoption,
while normalizing the data for other influences including size of municipality. The outcomes of
this research indicate that there is wide variability in the implementation of performance
measures across public administration bodies, but some consistency exists in the adoption
rates for different internal procedures. The authors did not address any effect that their
narrow definition of performance management may have had on the outcomes; as they
created this new definition for the study it is difficult to compare if these results accurately
connect to other research or real-world situations.

Alternatively, Charbonneau & Bellavance (2015) performed a statistical analysis of the
determinants of general, management, budgeting, and reporting uses of performance
information in the municipal performance management system in Quebec. Their research had
no general hypothesis but sought to diagnose potential problems in the implementation and
use of performance management at the local level. The research strategy used deductive
reasoning to evaluate survey results, with survey questions targeted to analyze the depth to
which participants used performance indicators. This study aimed to “identify the factors,
whether uncontrollable or controllable, that account for the uses of performance measurement
by municipal managers.” The existing provincial performance management system made use of
fourteen mandatory indicators, but several common services were left out including libraries,
fire, and police. The authors used descriptive statistics to analyze the different uses of
management indicators, with a thorough discussion on the limitations of the data and of
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previous studies. Two results are noteworthy. First, the authors found that indicators were
used more frequently when they showed encouraging results. Secondly, the positive influence
of leadership was not observed for performance management in Quebec. Other significant
findings showed that neither municipality population nor budget have a significant association
with the use of performance management. This study was well constructed and thoroughly
implemented. It revealed some surprising trends, including debunking a connection between
municipality size and the implementation of performance management. The study also found
strong evidence of ‘blame avoidance’ being a strong factor in declining internal performance.
The authors also thoroughly evaluated the limitations of the study which gave credibility and an
accurate framework with which to understand the results.

Research Methodology
Considering the extensive existing research on PMaS and less extensive research on municipal
performance, this study will review a sample of Ontario municipalities and compare public
documents regarding their strategic alignment with financial planning. While this research
focuses on two indicators of strategic planning, it is important to note that there are over 250
annual reporting requirements (AMCTO, 2017) for each municipality in the province,
demonstrating that municipal performance measurement and management is of interest to the
province and many regulatory agencies. Administrators must bear in mind all the requirements
of every regulatory agency during budget development, and these considerations will be
reflected financially in budget planning documents. However, it is the overall strategy of the
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municipality that guides the allocation of finite resources, therefore the strategic plans, asset
management plans, and budgets are the guiding documents for these major decisions.

Considering that the size and location of municipalities may have an influence on their
behaviours, municipalities have been chosen to represent small, medium, and large
communities in their respective region. Municipalities were randomly selected from south,
central, and northern Ontario. To remove the strategic inter-dependencies and financial
complexities of two-tier municipalities, only single tier municipalities were selected for this
study. While this does remove a significant portion of the total municipal study pool, there are
173 single-tier out of the total 444 Ontario municipalities, including 32 cities, 23 municipalities,
28 towns, 85 townships, and 5 villages (AMO, 2020). This distribution demonstrates there are
still representative samples within single tier municipal organizations. Fixed population figures
were not used as the size selection criteria, as municipal population density is unevenly
distributed within the province. The largest cities in the north and south are relatively small
when compared to cities in the central area including the greater Toronto area. The following
municipalities were randomly selected for this study:
Small (population)

Medium

Large

South

Ingersoll (14k)

Chatham-Kent (106k)

London (426k)

Central

Haldimand (50k)

Sudbury (169k)

Mississauga (770k)

North

Temiskaming Shores

Timmins (43k)

Thunder Bay (113k)

(10k)
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*strategic plan
website
(Statistics Canada, 2016)
Search for relevant documents was completed using both Google searches and the embedded
search feature of each municipal website. To ensure consistency among the municipal
comparators, Asset Management Plans, Strategic Plans, and 2020 Annual Budget documents
were used as study instruments. Each document was retrieved from each municipality’s public
website. Analysis of these documents demonstrated how effectively some municipalities in
Ontario are aligning their financial and strategic plans. By law, all municipalities in Ontario must
have an Asset Management Plan and published budget documents, but strategic plans are
optional (aside from Official Plans, which are strategic in nature). For budget analysis, 2020
annual budgets were used for all municipalities. The following documents were used in this
analysis:
Table 2: Inventory of documents used for research
Asset Management Plan

Strategic Plan

Haldimand

2017

None

Ingersoll

2016

None

Temiskaming

2015

2013 - “Municipal Cultural Plan”

Chatham-Kent

2017

2005

Sudbury

2016

2019-2027

Timmins

2019

2011-2020
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London

2019

2019-2023

Mississauga

2019

2009

Thunder Bay

2016

2019-2022

It is important to note that “None” under Strategic Plan in Table 2 does not indicate that the
municipality has no strategic planning complete; all study municipalities had some departmentspecific strategic plans available to the public. However, these municipalities did not have a
broad strategic plan governing all strategic decisions. For example, Haldimand County had a
section on their website titled “Strategic Plans,” containing two documents: Economic
Development Strategy and Tourism Action Plan. While both of these documents will guide
decision making in their respective municipal services, there is still an absence of high-level
strategic vision. In contrast, Chatham-Kent’s strategic plan webpage had 281 plans, reports,
and studies available to the public including an over-arching strategic plan to tie them all
together. While many of the Chatham-Kent documents have a very specific focus, such as
bridge financing or arena business plans, the public presentation of the information as
“strategic” speaks to the breadth of municipal considerations and gives context to strategic
decision making. In the sample municipalities, there was one aberration from the standard
“Strategic Plan” document in title: Temiskaming Shores titled their strategic plan a “Municipal
Cultural Plan,”demonstratingtheir strategic pivot from a resource-based economy to a culturebased economy. Despite the difference in title, this document was deemed a corporate
strategic plan for the purpose of this study due to its broad strategic focus.
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Considering the existing literature and effects of behavioural economics, this analysis will use
the following key categories (Franco-Santos et al., 2007) to review performance measurement
systems’ municipal role at the Council level:
(1) “measure performance” - This category encompasses the role of monitoring progress
and measuring/evaluating performance;
(2) “strategy management” - This category comprises the roles of planning, strategy
formulation, implementation/execution, and organizational alignment;
(3) “communication” - This comprises the roles of internal and external communication,
benchmarking and compliance with regulations;
(4) “influence behaviour” - This category encompasses the roles of rewarding or
compensating behaviour, managing relationships, and control; and
(5) “learning and improvement” - This comprises the roles of feedback, double-loop
learning, and performance improvement.

Analysis
The following analysis reviews the public information for the nine randomly selected
municipalities regarding the links to resource allocation and strategic planning. Table 3
identifies six indicators used to evaluate these connections. Two “budget linking” indicators
identify whether, through written text or website links, the financial budget information is
connected in some way to strategic plans. “Financial allocation” refers to any kind of budget
breakdown showing the relative fund allocations for tax and/or fee based public services.
“Service PMaS Information” refers to information showing the planned performance or units of
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service for public services or allocation areas. “Individualized costs noted” indicates whether
there is an individualized breakdown of financial costs, such as “a x% tax increase represents a
$xx.xx increase to the municipal tax bill for an average home valued at $xxx,xxx” or fee
examples, such as “a x.x% increase to fees moves next year’s public swim costs to $x.xx.” This
type of information adds individual cost context so that an individual tax- or fee-payer can put
the change in their own financial context. This allows them to contextualize the financial
change in terms of financial losses or gains compared to service delivery; service delivery should
be assumed to be equivalent for comparison purposes but was more often than not unstated.
“Individualized gains noted” is similar in meaning but is an indicator of what service
improvements an individual tax- or rate-payer may gain in their personal context. Please
remember that for this research, two-tier municipalities have been excluded to simplify the
sample pool and variables. However, there may be differing trends in this excluded sample set
that would differ from these results; further research could verify similarities or differences.
Table 3 summarizes the analysis of asset management plans, strategic plans, financial allocation
information, service PMaS information, individualized costs, individualized gains, and the
identified indicators for each sample municipality.

Table 3: Analysis of strategy and performance links to budget in 6 Ontario municipalities

Population Area

Budget
linking to
Asset
Management
Plan

Budget
Financial
Service
Individualized Individualized
linking
Example Indicators
Allocation
PMaS
costs noted
gains noted
Strategic
Information Information
Plan

Ingersoll

Small

South

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Haldimand

Small

Central

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Temiskaming Small

North

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

ChathamKent

South

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Medium

Sudbury

Medium

Central

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Timmins

Medium

North

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Primarily financial
information presented
Primarily financial
information presented
Financial information only
"Council Priorities" strategic
link to financial allocations
Strategic links: business
cases, public "budget
allocator" to set their own
priorities, service
benchmarking report, annual
BMA comparative study (9
years), municipal
benchmarking network
(MBN Can), monthly
performance dashboards
Most recent FIR and MPMP
data published, but MPMP
out of date.
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London

Large

South

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Mississauga

Large

Central

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Thunder Bay

Large

North

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Strategic plan not linked on
website but mentioned 37
times in budget report;
business cases used to link
financial costs of strategic
initiatives; some for cost
savings initiatives, others
justify new or changed
programs. London's strategic
plan dashboard shows PMaS
information for the top level
of leadership
Strategic links using business
cases; budget allocator tool
with no tie to actual service
levels; Strategic Plan does
have item completion
tracker. Budget executive
summary listed contextual
individual gains to users,
such as transit use, new
community centre, cricket
pitch, etc.
Budget lists specific local
improvements to sidewalks,
storm water, roads, parks,
lighting, linked to AMP.

The size of municipality in this study shows some level of development or maturation toward
linking strategic plans to financial plans. . By law, all municipalities must have financial budgets
and asset management plans published. This research supports an assumption that resourcing
available at larger municipalities may allow increased depth to strategic planning that smaller
municipalities may not be able to pursue; 78% of the municipalities in this study linked their
budget to their asset management plan. All of the large and medium municipalities in the study
link their asset management plans to their financial budgets, and most to their strategic plans.
Small municipalities tended to present the budget as a stand-alone financial plan. As to spatial
distribution, a clear pattern of linking finances to strategic plans does not emerge, while
acknowledging that the sample size is also too small to offer any statistically significant spatial
analysis. All of the central municipalities and two-thirds of the north and south regions
connected their budget to their asset management plans.

As to spatial distribution of strategic plan links (Table 4), 56% of the municipalities made the
budget link to their strategic plan; two-thirds in both south and central regions, and one-third in
the north. Total indicators based on spatial distribution indicate that there could be more links
to strategic planning and information that could compensate for loss aversion in the central and
south areas (central 72%, north 50%, south 66%).
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Table 4: Spatial distribution of link indicators
Values
Sum of Website or document cross-linking AMP
Sum of Website or document linking SP
Sum of General Financial Allocation Information
Sum of Service PMaS Information
Sum of Individualized costs noted
Sum of Individualized gains noted
Total #
Total %

Grand
Central North South Total
3
2
2
2
1
2
3
3
3
0
0
2
3
2
3
2
1
0
13
9
12
72%
50%
66%

7
5
9
2
8
3

Population distribution (Table 5) shows similar trends to spatial distribution; areas with higher
populations show more links between financial and strategic planning. This study shows that
larger cities make more links between financial and strategic planning, and also provide
information that could compensate for the effects of loss aversion: large 83%, medium 72%,
small 33%.

Table 5: Population distribution of link indicators
Values
Sum of Website or document cross-linking AMP
Sum of Website or document linking SP
Sum of General Financial Allocation Information
Sum of Service PMaS Information
Sum of Individualized costs noted
Sum of Individualized gains noted
Total #
Total %

Grand
Large Medium Small Total
3
3
1
3
2
0
3
3
3
1
1
0
3
3
2
2
1
0
15
13
6
83%
72%
33%

7
5
9
2
8
3
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Table 6 summarizes the distribution matrix by population and area for each factor, with sums
following for all factors.
Table 6: Distribution matrix by population category and location
Row Labels
Central
Sum of Website or document cross-linking AMP
Sum of Website or document linking SP
Sum of General Financial Allocation Information
Sum of Service PMaS Information
Sum of Individualized costs noted
Sum of Individualized gains noted
North
Sum of Website or document cross-linking AMP
Sum of Website or document linking SP
Sum of General Financial Allocation Information
Sum of Service PMaS Information
Sum of Individualized costs noted
Sum of Individualized gains noted
South
Sum of Website or document cross-linking AMP
Sum of Website or document linking SP
Sum of General Financial Allocation Information
Sum of Service PMaS Information
Sum of Individualized costs noted
Sum of Individualized gains noted
Total Sum of Website or document cross-linking AMP
Total Sum of Website or document linking SP
Total Sum of General Financial Allocation Information
Total Sum of Service PMaS Information
Total Sum of Individualized costs noted
Total Sum of Individualized gains noted

Large

Grand
Medium Small Total

1
1
1
0
1
1

1
1
1
0
1
1

1
0
1
0
1
0

3
2
3
0
3
2

1
1
1
0
1
1

1
0
1
0
1
0

0
0
1
0
0
0

2
1
3
0
2
1

1
1
1
1
1
0
3
3
3
1
3
2

1
1
1
1
1
0
3
2
3
1
3
1

0
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
3
0
2
0

2
2
3
2
3
0
7
5
9
2
8
3

Measuring Performance
Considering this new data and the existing literature, several observations can be made in line
with existing research. Otley & Barry (1980) note that actors or managers may have important
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distinctions in their understanding of mental or explicit models. This difference may cause
them to use control mechanisms differently. Franco-Santos et al. (2018) proposed that “PM(a)S
types will maximize the fit between the chosen control mechanism and the existing
organizational conditions,” considering Merton’s (1936) “purposeful actions” and Bedford et
al.’s (2016) directive or enabling foci. Municipal strategic plans should clarify goal alignment
and goal certainty, including identifying environmental characteristics that could affect goal
uncertainty (Broadbent and Laughlin 2009). Looking at the data, municipalities that clarify their
goals through their strategic and budget plans enable their municipal administrators to use a
stewardship-based approach. Smaller municipalities with limited financial links to strategy will
drive their administrators to agency-focused approaches. This is not to say that one or another
approach is superior; contingency research by Chenhall (2003) and Otley (2016) supports that
one approach may not be universal across organizations. This contingency approach further
supports the development of municipal strategic plans rooted in local culture and context.
However, based on the regulatory framework within which municipalities operate, they likely
have much more in common than they have differences.

As municipal leaders are chosen from their local population to representatively make
judgements and decisions on issues, municipal strategic planning emerges as the critical tool to
engage citizens in priority setting to provide what they deem as the most appropriate public
good to maintain the community that they envision. This citizen-driven strategy is the basis for
democracy, and is further supported by servant leadership theory (Parris, 2012).
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Strategy Management
Neoliberalism and capitalist business strategy are brought to mind as claims that government
should be “run like a business.” While this may be suggested to mean government needs to be
financially “lean,” it also supports the assertion that strategic planning is crucial in order for
municipalities to remain as strategically focused as a business enterprise would be.
Contextually, many of the largest private businesses in the world have less-than-majority
market shares; municipalities’ complex strategies are fundamentally different from businesses
in the way that citizens or customers can self-select their services. Municipal strategy is about
focusing limited resources on what will benefit citizens the most - having a strategy and
measuring performance is key. Citizens living in municipalities with a published strategic plan
will have less difficulty understanding their municipality’s intentions. However, the majority of
this study’s municipalities (77%) published no performance measurement data tied to their
strategic plans. In addition, the strategic plans were on a multi-year cycle while budgets in all
municipalities are approved annually. Citizens should know at least annually if the efforts of
the municipality, including the budget, are working towards and meeting the organization’s
goals. It is key that the PMaS and PMeS are synchronized so that resource allocation and
performance reporting can be made at complementary intervals.

If these systems are out of synchronization, what drives municipal strategy? The province
mandates financial reporting and asset management plans, their scope, and reporting intervals,
and many more details. This ensures that municipalities do not lose control of their financial
obligations and therefore impact the finances of the province. This research indicates that
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smaller municipalities in Ontario, irrespective of general location develop strategic plans less
frequently than higher populated comparators. While this could be due to the smaller financial
or staff resources of these municipalities, it also could be driven by other environmental
factors. Municipal councillors in small municipalities represent relatively small numbers of
constituents and often smaller physical jurisdictions; this lack of published strategic planning
may only indicate that these smaller municipalities do not require a plan as the elected
representatives may have a deeper knowledge and understanding of local issues, and the
breadth of issues may be limited by local environmental factors. However, if this is true, it is
still subject to the myopic limitations of the four-year election cycle.

Communication
Communication of all of the strategic information is key to understanding performance success.
One could argue that this study primarily analyzes the effectiveness of strategy communication,
and not the prevalence or interconnectedness of strategy itself. As local leaders, municipal
administrations need to communicate their plans and report their results to be held
appropriately accountable. Clear communication of plans and results will minimize the
tendency towards gaming, such as setting easily achievable results. The positive aspects of
communication have already been discussed in the Measurement Performance and Strategy
Management sections earlier. There is one key element of communication that is infrequently
found in this study: while individualized costs are common among study municipalities,
individualized gains are much less frequently published. Eighty-nine percent of study
municipalities published individualized costs such as “xx% tax increase per household”, while
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only 33% attempted to individualize gains. As previously noted, losses are much more acutely
felt than gains so it is imperative for municipalities to demonstrate the cost benefit to the
citizen, even as far as doubling the effort in demonstrating gains to mitigate loss aversion
effects.

Influence Behaviour
Beyond loss aversion, municipal councils are democratically incentivized to please the majority
of their stakeholders, or at least voters, and the primary information about their performance is
published by their own organization. The democratic importance of framing performance could
easily lead to gaming and the setting of easily accomplished tasks to present regular ‘wins’ to
the public (Merchant, 1990). In contrast, the strategic planning process undermines these
negative incentives by planning and publishing the goals at the outset of a planning period.
While this does not remove any political calculus involved in public opinion and re-election
strategy, it tips the scales in favour of public transparency. While this study focused on the
main drivers of costs and strategy in Ontario municipalities, these are not the only anchors that
the public has to measure municipal performance. Learning and improvement are the final
outcomes of effective performance management systems.

Learning & Improvement
Finally, learning and organizational improvement are a key output of effective PMaS and should
be an output of an effective strategy, performance management subsystems, and ultimately
municipal electoral accountability. All of the subject municipalities that published strategic
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plans noted a planning horizon and planning cycle; this is crucial to keep the strategy and
related resource allocations relevant to the community over time. Community cultures vary for
many reasons, and can change over time and due to forces within or without – all requiring
learning and improvement highlighted in the strategic plans and asset management plans. All
plans followed a contingency style, shaping the plan to the community’s vision, desires,
environment, and resources.

Conclusion
This research has revealed some clear links and patterns in budget allocations and strategic
planning in several representative Ontario municipalities. While each plan or budget may be
considered a control system in its own right (Ferreira and Otley 2009; Malmi and Brown 2008;
Otley 1999), the importance of linking the multiplicity of municipal plans and strategies to finite
resources remains clear. All documents must be “tightly connected” (Otley 2016, Weich 1976)
to effectively deliver services to the public and remain accountable. The province and its
regulatory bodies prescribe bounds and directives to municipalities and enable them through
the Municipal Act (2001) and other acts to carry out these duties, but it is clear that
municipalities use more than one way to accomplish these tasks. Municipalities will benefit by
linking their multiple plans and initiatives under one strategic plan to ensure matching
prioritization to finite resources. This matching will also allow the public to better frame their
decisions to ensure wise use of resources and to elect responsive and responsible
representatives. Limited strategy will drive service providers to directive or agency-based
systems and may lead to Procrustean budgeting when perspectives are disconnected or
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myopic. In the absence of a strategic plan, the municipal budget becomes the primary strategic
tool. In these situations, it is crucial for decision makers to understand their environment and
the behavioural economics related to the budget as a performance management system.
Municipalities deliver a wide variety of services that make performance management
complicated, but this should be the driver to ensure performance is managed transparently,
rather than letting loss aversion lead strategy. While municipalities are ‘creatures of the
province,’ they have their own elected officials and processes for political accountability. There
is no one set of values for any municipality or Ontarian; the municipal political system must be
leveraged effectively by linking finance, strategy, and politics to provide municipally and
culturally relevant local services to citizens.
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